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 Abstract 
A recent European Commission (EC) report highlighted widespread perceptions of corruption 
in public sector procurement (Anon 2014). The report identified that given the level of 
financials flows generated, public sector procurement is an area prone to overt and covert 
corrupt practices which are exacerbated by “weak governance which hinders market 
competition and raises the price paid by the administration for goods and services, directly 
impacting public expenditure and therefore tax payers resources. The financial interests at 
stake and the close interaction between public and private sectors make public procurement a 
major risk” (p21). We report a specific investigation, which bears out that conclusion. 
In UK Public Sector procurement the acronym OJEU, strictly speaking the Official Journal of 
the European Union has become short hand for the overall legal framework governing public 
procurement. The framework and its processes aim to increase transparency and eliminate 
trade barriers arising from discriminatory procurement. Ex ante transaction costs are, it is 
assumed, justified by ex post benefits. We test that assumption in one market sector and find 
the opposite. In a silent conspiracy those who benefit from the ex ante stages of the process 
do not enhance the ex post value-in-use for the intended beneficiaries. While not corruption 
per se, the outcome can be seen as emergent, or complicit, malfeasance. 
The specific research sought to identify the real and possible impacts of short-term duration 
contracts on stakeholders engaged in a sector of the Facilities Management (FM) market 
place. It focused on the trading relationships between private sector “suppliers” and public 
sector “buyers” providing Repairs and Maintenance (R&M) services to the Social Housing 
sector. As this channel has specific operational traits, legal obligations and common social, 
political and cultural dimensions it provided a controlled opportunity to identify issues that 
potentially emerge out of short-term contracts. 
Our review of the market identified a number of trends that, whilst pertinent to the supplier 
organisations, were also a feature of the industry. These were related to the procurement 
process, and how it influenced the structure of the businesses operating within the industry; 
the contract, which defines and shapes the business relationships; and additionally the 
management of the procurement and award process
1
.  
Short-termism in outsourced R&M contracting has a potential negative cost, for both “buyer” 
and “supplier”, in terms of increased ex ante and ex post transaction costs. The process 
operates to the benefit of those involved in doing or advising on the procurement and contract 
management to the detriment of the supposed beneficiaries, the tenants of the Social Housing 
stock. We cannot call the process deliberate corruption. We do though argue that the term 
'emergent malfeasance’ is justified.  
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 One of us held a board level position in the industry with extensive contacts 
 Introduction 
A recent European Commission (EC) report highlighted widespread perceptions of corruption 
in public sector procurement (Anon 2014). The report identified that given the level of 
financials flows generated, public sector procurement is an area prone to overt and covert 
corrupt practices which are exacerbated by “weak governance which hinders market 
competition and raises the price paid by the administration for goods and services, directly 
impacting public expenditure and therefore tax payers resources. The financial interests at 
stake and the close interaction between public and private sectors make public procurement a 
major risk” (p21). We report a specific investigation, which bears out that conclusion. 
In UK Public Sector procurement the acronym OJEU, strictly speaking the Official Journal of 
the European Union has become short hand for the overall legal framework governing public 
procurement. The framework and its processes aim to increase transparency and eliminate 
trade barriers arising from discriminatory procurement. Ex ante transaction costs are, it is 
assumed, justified by ex post benefits. We test that assumption in one market sector and find 
the opposite. In a silent conspiracy those who benefit from the ex ante stages of the process 
do not enhance the ex post value-in-use for the intended beneficiaries. While not corruption 
per se, the outcome can be seen as emergent, or complicit, malfeasance. 
The specific research sought to identify the real and possible impacts of short-term duration 
contracts on stakeholders engaged in a sector of the Facilities Management (FM) market 
place. It focused on the trading relationships between private sector “suppliers” and public 
sector “buyers” providing Repairs and Maintenance (R&M) services to the Social Housing 
sector. As this channel has specific operational traits, legal obligations and common social, 
political and cultural dimensions it provided a controlled opportunity to identify issues that 
potentially emerge out of short-term contracts. 
The UK Social Housing sector manages in excess of 5.5 million properties, has a rental 
turnover of £12.bn. per annum
2
 and directly employees over 250,000 people. The housing 
stock is managed by several thousand organisations, which range from Local Authorities 
(LA) and Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) to Housing Associations (HAs). The sector is 
highly regulated and controlled, with considerable polarisation in the market place.  
The current market potential for R&M suppliers to the Sector exceeds £14.0bn per annum
3
. 
In recent years, several of the major construction companies have sought to enter the market 
due to economic down turn or competitor pressure within their core markets. Their entry 
routes have been either aggressive pricing or acquisition of niche market property services / 
FM organisations. The supply chain of main contractors and subcontractors employs over 
65,000 FTE’s.  
Our review of the market in 2011 identified a number of trends that, whilst pertinent to the 
supplier organisations, were also a feature of the industry. These were related to the 
procurement process, and how it influenced the structure of the businesses operating within 
the industry; the contract, which defines and shapes the business relationships; and 
additionally the management of the procurement and award process
4
.  
Our research suggested that short-termism in outsourced R&M contracting does have a 
potential negative cost, for both “buyer” and “supplier”, in terms of increased ex ante and ex 
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This is based on the average weekly rental income per property. It should be noted that 70% of this figure is 
provided by the State in the form of Housing and other benefits. 
3
 An element of the research project was to gather information on a daily basis from the Official Journal of the 
European Union - TED website regarding government and NGO tenders, their contract term value and the 
period and specific contract details. Inside Housing published the value of R&M as £14.0bn for 2010. 
4
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post transaction costs. However, short-termism may be desired position for elements of the 
supply chain due to increased buying opportunities and hence profit potential. Does it allow 
the “buyer” to reduce risk due to poor procurement practice and an inability to effectively 
contract manage their “suppliers'” performance due to asset management not being their core 
competency ? Are the levels of transaction costs and inefficient service a price worth paying? 
- Alternatively does the process operate to the benefit of those involved in doing or advising 
on the procurement and contract management to the detriment of the supposed beneficiaries; 
the tenants of the Social Housing stock? Our argument after the research is that it does. We 
cannot call the process deliberate corruption. We do though argue that the term 'emergent 
malfeasance’ is justified.  
Literature 
Today’s purchasing practices are assumed by academics to have evolved in an orderly 
manner from past practice. Emiliani (2010 116) suggests that practitioners of modern 
industrial purchasing and supply chain management lack a historical perspective in the 
execution of their strategic and day-to-day procurement practices. By assuming that current 
practices are favourably grounded in past practice they avoid questioning their own practices 
in respect of ethics, effectiveness or corporate responsibility. Emiliani goes on to argue that 
current practices have ignored history and the hard won lessons and that subsequently 
procurement practice has become internally focused and standardised for both the “buyer” 
and the “supplier” organisations. The result is tensions between the parties whose interests 
should ideally at least, - be fundamentally similar, i.e. the supply of R&M services to the 
Residents.  
At the heart of the debate is a mathematical equation. The optimum design would be a non –
zero-sum (win-win) outcome, whereas in practice buyers seek to realise zero-sum outcomes 
(Emiliani 2004, 2010). The value network for R&M (Figure 1) operates within a volatile and 
highly regulated environment with polarisation of “buyers” and “suppliers”, exacerbated by a 
fixed market in terms of stock volume. Given this position, are the unintended consequences 
of aggressive procurement practice opportunistic behaviour as the suppliers within the value 
network seek to redress the position? 
Procurement process design is limited and outlined specifically by OJEU
5
 , but crucially the 
procurement process design, content and evaluation criteria rest with the “buyer”. New public 
management (Horton 2003) and the desire to adopt the practices of the market increase the 
desire to emphasise a price reduction strategy despite what the purchasing media have long 
said about the shortcomings of “price beating” and the use of finance based performance 
based metrics as a measure of success.  
Academically the effects of polarisation or “buyer” / “supplier” consolidation in a market is 
not widely covered within the context of the development of procurement and supply 
networks, although the fixation with price beating also the adoption of sharp practice and 
coercive practice within the product and services industries is widespread. Additionally 
studies show the consequences of such actions; i.e. poor supplier relationships (Hannon, 
2003), loss of supplier technology, bankrupt suppliers (McCracken & Glader, 2007) and 
supplier retaliation (Emiliani and Stec, 2004; 2005), in the form of agency, price fixing and 
bid rigging
6
 and an unwillingness to succumb to “buyers'” requests. 
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 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31/03/2004 on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts 
6
 In 2009, the OFT imposed fines totalling £129.0m on 103 construction firms, which it had found, had colluded 
with competitors on building contracts. These activities were mostly in the form of “cover pricing”. This total 
was reduced on appeal. 
The available academic literature available tends to assume the procurement professional. A 
feature identified in this research was that well-intentioned amateurs are prevalent in R&M 
service procurement design and process in all but the largest of the “buyer” organisations. 
They predominately have a skill bias in finance or operational practice (either housing or 
maintenance). Keasey et al (2000) suggest several dysfunctional consequences of such 
practice: specifically misinterpretation, ossification and sub optimisation. Bouwman (1984) 
compares the decision making process of what are deemed “Experts” and “Novices”, saying 
that it was “Experts”  who typically transferred reason into recognition, a position supported 
by Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986 30), espousing that “....experts don’t solve problems and don’t 
make decisions; they do what normally works”. In summary, finance and operations may not 
be good surrogates for professionals in purchasing.  
However, even an all-embracing contract cannot protect against a lack of economic trust and 
ex ante opportunism due to poor assessment capability (Ricktts, 2001). Additionally internal 
toxic incentives encourage goal distortion (Chapman, 2005), a “milk and move” culture 
(Jackall, 1983) and the implications for service delivery when managers “hit the target” from 
the perception of securing works for a budget, but “miss the point - fixated on targets without 
appreciating the impact on quality of service (Bevan & Hood, 2006). A point infrequently 
considered within the sphere of procurement literature is service delivery and ex post 
transaction costs generated by adverse selection, in particular the cost of measurement, 
contract management and opportunism through bounded rationality and imperfect 
commitment.  
A major problem that economics associates with the “commons” is that its benefits are 
readily accessible to all, that it is generally seen to have few barriers to entry and as a 
consequence is prone to misuse, resulting in the well-known “tragedy of the 
commons”(TOC) (Harding, 1968). Economic convention presents arguments about the 
commons, premised on methodological individualism and rational choice presenting a model 
that conceptualises the commons as being (1) owned by a collective of actors and (2) 
objectively given, where the pursuit of self-interest can lead to the degradation of the said 
commons. The basically essentialist model make an assumption that the actors are norm – 
free and opportunistic maximisers of short–term interests whose actions, in the absence of 
restrictions to access, tend not to contribute to the long-term interests of the collective. 
Additionally the collective action of the group has the potential to lead to sub–optimal 
outcomes for all actors. Consequently, it creates collective misuse and a “degradation” of the 
commons. Ostrom (1999) describes the TOC as a metaphor for the problems of overuse, 
citing that resource users are norm free maximisers of immediate gains, who will not 
cooperate to overcome the common dilemmas that they face. 
The TOC is frequently argued as an example of market failure, where organisations using the 
commons impose external costs on their rivals. Mason & Phillips (1997) suggest, “this 
externality can be both static and dynamic”. Static externality reflects the “crowding” 
problem where each firm's costs rise with industry output as the number of players in the 
market increases.  Ex ante transaction costs linked to procurement, are a significant portion of 
all firms’ costs and must be recovered from the market if firms are to continue to trade. 
Additionally a larger number of firms increases competition, potentially leading to lower 
“output” prices and a squeeze on margin. The dynamic externality exists if current actions 
lead to higher future costs (op.cit 148); i.e. cost will change from one period to the next when 
access to “stock” changes. 
The Social Housing R&M market is dynamic in terms of competitive procurement practices, 
which are highly regulated via OJEU. Al-Fattal (2009), suggests that the TOC has proved to 
be an important political economic concept as it has the capability to determine cooperation 
between actors to “conserve the common good and to lessen the transaction costs of 
negotiation and enforcement”. However, within OJEU practice co-operation is seen as a 
major source of post award legal challenge with charges of opportunist behaviour and profit 
maximisation.  
Given then that liberalisation of trade is a pre-requisite, and desirous on the part of the 
“buyers”; what is the impact of suppliers seeking to win greater market share within a 
cyclical, pre defined market? Mason & Phillips (1997) outline the non-cooperative 
equilibrium, setting out that a dash for growth by suppliers reduces their short-term 
profitability.  “Construction firm profits slump due to high competition”. (Inside Housing 
18/2/2014) This market position is further exacerbated over time as the size of the cyclical 
market alters, as there may not be sufficient work available to win in the medium-term. 
Should this reduce the numbers of actors competing either through polarisation (the 
financially / operationally stronger – buying the weaker) or administration / liquidation, the 
long - term position would be increased negatively for buyers. 
Methodology 
Design 
To investigate these hypothetical effects in one particular market segment we adopted a 
pluralist “mixed methods” design. Triangulating quantitative and qualitative data allowed 
comparison, validation or corroboration of the results and was grounded in a theoretical 
objection to the increasing polarisation found in current methodological orthodoxy (Anon1 
for review). The two forms of data bring a greater insight into the problem than would be 
obtained by using only a single method. Organisations are often intensely political arenas. 
Researchers relying on documentary evidence are advised to use triangulation to enhance 
validity and reliability (Saunders et al, 2000).We utilised document analysis, data charting, 
and qualitative, but realist, ethnography (Sanday, 1979; Anon2 for review) via semi-
structured interviews, a time lapsed study of an HA SBU and netnography within industry 
sector blog sites.  
Triangulated or mixed method design should emphasise a study’s particular purpose, (Morse 
& Neihaus, 2009). Questions and source of can be fixed or emergent (Creswell & Plano 
Clarke 2011 55), albeit these two positions should be considered as ends on a continuum and 
not as a clear dichotomy. We implemented the qualitative and qualitative strands 
concurrently and gave them equal priority. The strands were independently analysed before 
the results were combined during the overall interpretation of the findings. 
Interviews 
We interviewed senior managers, directors and partners of organisations operating within the 
value network to identify the rhetoric and the reality of short-termism for all stakeholders 
engaged in the procurement, delivery and management of R&M services. Our objective was 
to obtain conflict or consensus and emergent themes from the qualitative research data, which 
could be compared and contrasted to data obtained from document analysis and customer 
satisfaction surveys. We had a privileged level of access to interview targets within the 
industry and value network (Figure 1) and therefore believe our sample was representative of 
the sector.  
 
TAKE IN FIGURE 1 
 
Realist  Ethnography  
Anon2 for review, building on the work of Scott-Morgan (1994) and reverting to the position 
of Sanday (1979) suggest that ethnography should unearth the rules for proper and 
predictable conduct as judged by the people studied. Their challenge is that ethnography as 
inductive can be realist and “in this view uncover real unwritten rules of the game in such a 
manner that enables diagnosis”. Scott-Morgan (1994) argues that analysing ethnographic data 
for common motivators, enablers and “triggers reveals unwritten rules as routines of 
organisational behaviour. His pragmatic stance “against necessary immersion” is that a 
combination of internal and external research can assist with the speedy elucidation of a 
particular set of unwritten rules. Our pragmatic approach was broadly ethnographic but 
prioritised Sanday's (1979) successful outcome.  
Documentation Analysis 
The emphasis was on reviewing documents that provided an insight into operational 
capability and performance. In terms of relevance and materiality, the documents were 
gauged against a rigorous set of criteria Scott’s (2004) Authenticity, Representativeness, 
Meaning and CredibilityDocuments analysed were audited financial accounts and board 
reports, Audit Commission reports, Housing Corporation and Tennant Services Authority
7
 
surveys: quality control and audit reports, OJEU reports and official EU “White papers”. 
Results 
Our research focused on public sector procurement and considered the procurement process, 
the contract and management capability of the process. The primary objectives of European 
procurement legislation are the creation of competition within the supply of services to 
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 http://www.homesandcommunities.co.uk/tsa-archive  
Government bodies, the delivery of the best value for money by generating the lowest 
transaction costs to achieve the best procurement outcomes and to aid the fight against 
corruption. Anon (2014) nevertheless identifies the issue of corruption in the process as a 
complex phenomenon, with 64% of UK companies surveyed responding that overt corruption 
was wide spread, (p6) with the construction sector being deemed to being particularly 
vulnerable to corrupt public practice. (p17 & p27). The report did not comment on covert 
corruption but acknowledged that further strengthening in the integrity in standards and 
practice is called for. (p34)  
We believe the process in practice displays bounded rationality. Negligence and opportunism 
have created interrelatedness within the value network, adding concentration via “supplier: 
buyer” polarisation. The unintelligent design and inconsistent management of the process has 
not delivered uniform value in use for the resident whilst creating quasi rents for elements 
within the supply chain. 
Delivery of value for money 
The ultimate effectiveness of the procurement process can be gauged from the responses to 
customer satisfaction surveys and organisational reviews undertaken by the Tenants Services 
Authority (TSA) and Housing Corporation (HC). The output of HAs service to their residents 
was defined in terms of “value for money” (as defined by the TSA within its 2010 regulatory 
framework and assessed by the Audit Commission
8
).  Analysis of R&M services delivered at 
a macro level to the Social Housing sector identifies several trends (Tenants Services 
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 The Role of the Audit Commission  has been redefined following the “bonfire of quangos” 
Authority, Existing Tenants Survey 2008
9
 ; Housing Corporations Survey of existing 
Housing Association Tenants, 2006
10
). 
 The HC 2006 report cited that “There was a clear link between the repairs service provided 
by the HA and the HAs overall satisfaction level” (p64). Tenants who were satisfied with the 
repairs service were also satisfied with the overall services of the Landlord (91%) and only 
28% of tenants who were dissatisfied with the repairs service were satisfied with the overall 
performance of the Landlord. Only 78% of respondents thought that their rent provided value 
for money (p7).  
All respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction with the way in which their Landlord 
deals with day-to-day R&M. A majority (71%) were satisfied with this aspect of service 
delivery. There was an improvement in these figures where tenants had direct experience of 
the R&M service (75%). However, where tenants had reported a repair but had had no work 
completed the overall Landlord satisfaction falls to 42%. with those “totally dissatisfied” 
rising threefold to 37%. Of those surveyed who had reported a repair and this “had not been 
completed”, 54% expressed satisfaction with overall service of their Landlord. The HC 2006 
report concludes, “...which suggests that between 200,000 and 250,000 tenants had reported 
a repair across the UK social housing estate and that no repair works had been completed” 
(p66). 
The key elements relating to resident satisfaction with the R&M works were: 
  the time it took for the works to commence from initial reporting, 
 the slow speed with which the work was completed and  
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 D 19307 successful interviews undertaken by Ipsos Mori 
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 9184 successful interviews were conducted with tenants  from 97 HAs based in the UK  
 the repair being completed first time. 
Drawing on the trends identified in these two surveys and the numbers of properties in the 
HA estate,  it would be reasonable to postulate that there would be approximately 15,000,000 
R&M activities per annum and that potentially 3,000,000 of these activities would leave the 
tenants dissatisfied with the service that they have received. Given the importance of R&M to 
the tenants in the surveys, and the clarity provided by the Key Lines of Enquiry (KLoE’s)11 to 
the HAs, and through them to the supply chain, it seems that despite the time, effort and cost 
spent the procurement process adopted within the value network, and its management, does 
not facilitate a consistent R&M service delivery. The regulation of the process and the 
revenue spend on establishing the contract does not appear to achieve its notional objective of 
achieving the desired results for the intended beneficiaries raising the question of why not. 
The procurement process 
We found that the design and management of the procurement process had increased 
fragility, created contradicting objectives and lead to mal distribution within the market. The 
finding is consistent with the recent report on the EU as a whole. Anon (2014 25) found that 
40% of respondents were not participating in public sector procurement as they believed that, 
specifications were “tailor made” for specific companies, there were conflicts of interests 
created and unclear selection or evaluation criteria. 
The procurement process should be designed to achieve the most competitive price that the 
services could be delivered for, and to achieve the strategic criteria of the KLoE’s i.e. 
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 Key Lines of Enquiry are the levels of  performance expected by the Audit Commission in its inspections of 
the strategic approach to housing within a HA and local authority area(s) 
www.auditcommission.gov.uk/housing/inspection/Keylinesofenquiry/Pages 
 
 
“capacity to deliver” and “value for money”, via “value in exchange”. However, in 
outsourced R&M service supply, “value in exchange” for the buyer may not equate to “value 
in use” for the Resident. The highly competitive nature of the procurement process destroys 
value creation and service quality. (c.f. Gummesson, 1998). Either the sector lacks a 
consistent understanding of the concept of service quality or it is ignored within the design of 
the procurement process.  
Our interviews included senior members of the “buyers” and “suppliers” within the value 
network; and to gain an insight into the causes and consequences of short-term trading.  To 
interpret our findings we developed a framework within the context of the EU directive 
2004/18/EC and drawing on the work of Walker and Brammer (2009) and Gelderman et al 
(2006).The framework considered: 
 Buyer /supplier familiarity with EU policy and process 
 The perceived inefficiencies of the EU policy 
 Organisational incentives 
 Intelligent client/ Intelligent supplier selection 
For the “buyers” the principle issues identified related to process capability: the content and 
design of the contract notice, the evaluation process and the context management of the 
contract award. 
The responses from the market seem atypical. The EU evaluation report, Impact and 
effectiveness of EU public procurement legislation (Anon 2011) identifies that on average an 
OJEU Contract notice receives 7.8 bids for the “Open” procedure12 and 5.5 bids for the 
“Restricted” procedure for property services within the UK. Our interview data suggest this 
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 Construction/ service sector 
figure is “light”. For example, an internal document provided by an interviewee advised that 
it had taken the strategic decision to fully outsource R&M delivery across the nationally 
structured group. It reported, “The contract notice was published on - a given date - and 
within 7 days of the notice being published 90 statements of interest had been received”. The 
market seems crowded: an obvious influence on static externalities and (Mason & Phillips, 
1997) an economic condition conducive to a tragedy of the commons. 
The procurement decision 
In practice cost dominates procurement decisions. Over 95% of the contract notices we read 
were based on the “restricted” procedure Twenty five percent% of the awarded contracts 
were to be on a framework basis
13
 and that the predominant evaluation criteria was the “most 
economic and advantageous tender” (MEAT). This in turn was heavily biased in terms of 
price over quality, with 94% of notices weighting price at 70% or higher. 
“The weightings are reflecting the economic squeeze. Quality and specifically capability are 
of paramount importance, but these are a secondary consideration.” MLD (Litigation lawyer 
The critical element of procurement process is the design of the published contract notice. 
Anon (2014 27) notes “that public procurement at regional and local levels raises particular 
issues where discretionary powers are not matched with sufficient checks and balances..... at 
the same time internal control mechanisms are weak” a position supported by one NGO 
interviewee who expresses a negative opinion on the procurement capability within HAs.  
“We have questioned the procurement capability “in house” to successfully scope the 
process, and they have frequently bought in advice which they did not know how to manage. 
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 The UK is the largest user of Framework contracts with over 40% of all OJEU notices being posted by UK 
authorities. 
If public bodies coordinated procurement more effectively it would significantly reduce their 
tendering costs.” ANGO1 (Senior manager in  HCA) 
The Housing Associations (HA) interviewed had a procurement policy that was usually based 
on organisational mass. The larger HAs had their own procurement departments and engaged 
procurement professionals. The smaller HAs either undertook the work themselves or 
engaged with “procurement clubs”, buying consortia or consultants. This itself potentially 
increased transaction costs.  
“External commissioning is beset by barriers. The cost of procurement is stated as a 
substantial concern. Money is considered “wasted”. Technical barriers are cited as relating 
to staff, due diligence and cost, but there is an acknowledgement of the inevitability of 
consultancy fees.” TSA 2009 
Responses 
Irrespective of organisational size, the commoditisation of the content of the contract notice 
created several issues. Only, the larger contractors could fulfil elements of the evaluation 
criteria
14
. They then sub-contracted service delivery to Tier 2 and Tier 3 sub-contractors. 
(Anon 2014 26) identifies a risk due to “....the frequently occurring problem relating to the 
drafting of tailor-made specifications to favour certain bidders and splitting tenders into 
smaller bids”15 . Our findings are rather that the complexity of the regulated procurement 
process creates a commercial environment that favours sub-contracting. 
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 These being driven by organisational sales revenues and the percentage of individual contract spend relative 
to the revenue stream of the organisation. The SME share of contract wins is the lowest in the EU 
15
 The previous example cited where there were 90 expressions of interest, whilst contradicting the preferred 
used of main contractors, identifies poor design of the content of the contract notice, hence the volume of 
interest. 
The critical elements for the suppliers were contract mobilisation and the absorption of the 
costs related to it, and additionally, the invoice settlement terms and its impact on their 
debtor/ creditor days ratios. The impact of contract duration and cash flow was not 
recognised or “surfaced” by the “buyer” interviewees, and was not considered as part of the 
procurement process selection or evaluation criteria. Equally unconsidered are the financial 
aspects of profitability and liquidity within the suppliers sub-contract supply chain, either at 
the point of award or indeed throughout the “life” of the contract. Increased levels or 
shortfalls of works against the tendered budget or, peculiar to this market place, the number 
of contracts that commence simultaneously for the supply network, both contribute to a 
classic over-trading situation. 
Meanwhile the buyers, via their procurement processes are simply following a process 
without concern as to its impact or relevance, either on the market they are procuring from or 
on the value in use of the services for residents. Our interpretation of the “buyers’” contract 
notices is that they lack an understanding of the R&M services delivery, which they were 
seeking to procure. A commoditised process renders evaluation easier but encourages 
contract pricing that bears no relevance to the actual works to be undertaken to maintain the 
asset stock. Ultimately the result is either achieving an overspend for the HA or non-delivery 
or services for the resident. (TSA 2008) 
Pricing of R&M services was commoditised to assist in the tender evaluation process, with 
the frequent use of Schedules of Rates (SOR) or price per property schemes. These impact on 
the services especially where Tier 2 and Tier 3 contractors are utilised and their cost of 
operation is unknown by the sub contractor management. The pricing methodology and a 
poor understanding of contract pricing creates an environment of opportunism for the 
supplier in the guise of non-delivery, job building and value engineering. (HC 2006) as they 
seek to recover trading margin. 
Within the Larger HA’s, who engaged procurement professionals, it was frequently identified 
that the procurement team did not know if the contract could be delivered for  price submitted 
by the supplier, or what impact that sub-optimal pricing would have within the value 
network
16
. The design and content of the contract notice did not consider supply chain 
delivery. The professionals' sole aim for a successful procurement exercise was to achieve 
“value in exchange” for the HA which was frequently driven by individual incentive 
schemes. Where a budget was set the procurement team might be personally financially 
rewarded for securing the contracts under that budget. There was no consideration of whether 
the service could actually be delivered for the tendered price. 
The commoditisation of the process additionally created issues of duplication due to the use 
of frameworks and buying consortia. Anon, 2001, an EU review  identified that 20% of  
advertised contracts were potentially covered within existing contract awards, concluding that 
2500 public tendering excersises undertaken during 2008 were unnecessary. We suggest that 
commoditisation is driving a “one size fits all” approach, which benefits elements of the 
“buyer” community and Main contractors, and which contradicts effective procurement 
practice as outlined in the EU directive. “There is always a problem when you are pricing 
from a larger framework. The Buyer is not going to select a contractor who has bid in a 
process and who you know has forensically examined their stock and their business, 
additionally buyers would have to accept a standardised method of delivery, which may not 
be relevant” PBD (Public sector procurement lawyer) 
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 There being a step back from the main contractor pricing within the tiers of sub-contractors. 
Contractual relationship 
The procurement and the award process is the preamble to the contractual relationship. The 
rationale for a contract is to specify the rights and obligations of parties within a business 
relationship and to serve as a communication tool and reduce risk. Within the context of 
governance, the form of contract should demonstrate a commitment to fulfilling strategic 
intent and providing structure and management to business operations, but it should not 
govern how businesses operate. Our research identified that standard forms of contract were 
predominantly used in the relational exchange because the “buyer's” procurement team were 
familiar with them rather because of their suitability for service delivery. The contracts can 
be considered incomplete relative to the level of ex ante activity within the procurement 
process. They did not reflect the heterogeneous nature or the future requirements of the HA 
and were static relative to the asset and levels of performance over the contract life. 
The central consideration for this relational exchange is that it is “outsourced”. The Social 
Housing market place operates within a value network and the divergent constructs and 
interests of “buyers” and “suppliers” only increase with the introduction of additional parties 
to the equation. The need for regulation of relationships between more than just “buyer” and 
“supplier” is arguably critical to multi-contractual relationships. (Cardellino and Finch, 
2006).  All the “suppliers” confirmed that they sub-contracted works, based on either a 
geographical location or the requirement to supply specialist services. The main contractors 
self-deliver no more than 85% of their contracted services. In most cases, the figure was 
substantially less. The majority of the sub-contracted 2
nd
 tier and 3
rd
 tier suppliers are not 
engaged on back-to-back contracts with the "suppliers” potentially exposing both the 
“suppliers” and “buyers” to financial and regulatory risk which may not have been envisaged 
by the “buyers” when the decision to outsource was made or the procurement process of to 
appoint a contractor was designed. Additionally patronage and nepotism to the sub-
contractors benefit if not consistent were insufficiently challenged within the processes to 
appoint them. In the supply chain the main contract is frequently ignored in preference to a 
construction based standard contract, with which a quantity surveyor or contract manager 
may be familiar, but which does not reflect the desire of the “buyers'” contract notice or the 
stated intent of the KLoEs.  
Analysis of several forms of standard contracts identified standardised terms and conditions 
and key performance indicators, however whilst the archetypes of the asset stock may be 
standardised, the asset condition would not be. There are 8 basic property types in the sector 
with a wide variance in the current state of repair. Commoditised pricing methodologies take 
little or no account of such variation.  
 “ They require additional design to the cost models, services specification and performance 
management criteria to address issues that relate to service delivery. The T&C’s are now so 
standardised by firms of consultants , they are like finger prints – you can read them and 
identify who has amended the contract as even the amendments are now becoming 
standardised !” MLD. (Litigation lawyer) 
There is a clear link to the use standard forms of contract and the concept of Goods-Dominant 
Logic (Enquist et al, 2011) with its emphasis on operand resources and physical output which 
is driven by the OJEU procurement process and the view that “value in exchange” is the 
primary requirement for an effective procurement in  the “HA world”. 
As governance is not evaluated within the award process is contractual governance a 
procurement consideration?  However, with short-term trading cycles, how relevant is the 
contract? An interviewee outlining the limited number of contract determinations during 
2011 for poor service delivery, challenging the concept that service quality is important 
within the relational exchange. (Yousoff et al 2008) 
 “..the aim is to get a contractor to deliver the works for a price that the authority is prepared 
to pay –under a contract that they are prepared to enter into. The contracts must be more 
dynamic and enable a different relationship between the buyer and the supplier - It must be 
about outcomes- not price”. PBD (Public sector procurement lawyer) 
Discussion  
In summary customer satisfaction survey results (HC 2006) suggest KLoEs of “service 
quality” and “value” are not being delivered by the complex set of relational exchanges in the 
R&M value network. The market is crowded. The procurement process is routinized under 
OJEU, commoditised and detached from service delivery. Procurement specialists are 
rewarded for beating budgets as ultimately are suppliers and subcontractors if they stay in 
business. Advisors can thrive on the complexity of the process. The various parties in the 
network have different and limited perspectives on performance; limits encouraged by the 
operand reward systems. “Buyers” and “Suppliers” and their supply chain view 
“performance” from different perspectives neither of which necessarily embraces effective 
service delivery. The principal beneficiaries of the procurement regulations seem to be the 
procurers.  
The EU procurement regulations, at least as they are interpreted and translated into working 
practices within value networks introduce, or at least enable, excessive transaction costs 
without creating value for the residents. Additionally, none of the actors engaged in the 
exchange actually quantifies the ex ante costs, consequently spending millions of pounds per 
annum on potentially irrelevant and unproductive activities which ultimately fail to 
consistently deliver a robust R&M service but get recovered from the public purse. The 
causes of short-term duration trading relationships are known to all within the value network, 
as are the consequences of adverse selection but generally they remain unaddressed.  
We suggest the OJEU process and associated practice supports a tragedy of the commons; a 
position of emergent malfeasance based on the level ex ante transaction costs and subsequent 
revenue spend to suppliers that delivers poor value in use for the Resident and is financially 
supported by the State in the form of Housing benefits? 
Cui bono? 
By observation, short-termism creates rents for certain groups within the relational exchange. 
The advisors to the “buyers” have an interest in maintaining short duration trading, also 
acting as advisors to the unsuccessful “suppliers” within legal challenges17.Those engaged 
with “procuring” the works within also benefit when the “buyers” buy the undeliverable deal 
and then have to re tender within the complexity of the OJEU process. The continuous cycle 
of short duration contracts enables the large PLC suppliers, who need with the larger 
“buyers”, to “make” their market. However, as outlined in our introduction, at what cost for 
the sector? Moreover, is this a price worth paying? 
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